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Abstract 
This paper develops a matching model à la Pissarides (2000) in order to explain the 
basic facts of housing markets, most of all the variance in house prices. Price 
dispersion is basically due to both the ex-ante heterogeneity of the parties and the 
search costs of buyers and sellers. In fact, sellers and buyers spend time and money 
before concluding the deal. Furthermore, the house price is substantially determined 
by bargaining between the parties. These factors affect the selling price and lead to 
price dispersion. This simple theoretical model is able to take these distinctive features 
into account, thus explaining the basic facts of housing markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Housing markets are characterized by a decentralized framework of exchange with 
important search and matching frictions. It has, in fact, been acknowledged that 
housing markets clear not only through price but also through the time that a buyer 
and a seller spend on the market. Consequently, the search and matching approach is 
widely used even in this type of market (see e.g., Wheaton, 1990; Albrecht et al., 2007; 
Caplin and Leahy, 2008; Diaz and Jerez, 2009; Maury and Tripier, 2010; Genesove and 
Han, 2010; Lisi, 2011; Leung and Zhang, 2011). Furthermore, three basic facts have 
been repeatedly reported:  (a) the positive correlation between housing price and 
trading volume (see Leung, Lau and Leong, 2002; Fisher et al., 2003, among others), (b) 
between housing price and the time-on-the market (see Leung, Leong and Chan, 2002; 
Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Diaz and Jerez, 2009, among 
others), and (c) the existence of price dispersion. The latter is probably the most 
important distinctive feature of housing markets. Price dispersion (or volatility) refers 
to the phenomenon of selling the same product in near locations at the same time but 
at different prices. Although price dispersion research is more commonly found in 
studies of non-durable consumption goods,
1
 price dispersion studies on durable and 
re-saleable goods such as real estate are also growing rapidly (see e.g. Read, 1991; 
Gabriel et al., 1992; Baharad and Eden, 2004; Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006; Yiu et al., 
2005, 2006, 2008; and Wong et al., 2006, 2007). Real estate is in fact the most 
important durable consumption good and one of the most important assets for most 
household portfolios (Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). Since most transactions of real 
estate come from re-sales between individual buyers and sellers (transactions in the 
housing markets are in fact dominated by a second-hand market), it should not be 
surprising that price dispersion exists in the housing market (Leung, Leong and Wong, 
2006). 
According to the “housing price dispersion” literature, the variance in house prices 
cannot be attributed completely to the heterogeneous nature of real estate. In fact, a 
significant part of house price dispersion is basically due to the ex-ante heterogeneity 
of buyers and sellers (bargaining power, tastes, asymmetric information) and their 
sustained search costs. Indeed, sellers and buyers spend time and money (for 
                                                 
1
 A detailed literature review on price dispersion can be found in Baye et al. (2006). 
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advertising vacancies and making the effort to visit the greatest number of houses) 
before concluding the deal. Furthermore, the house price is substantially determined 
by bargaining between the parties. These factors affect the selling price and lead to 
price dispersion, since for different bargaining powers and search costs the selling 
price will be different. 
The main aim of this paper is to develop a search and matching model à la Pissarides 
(2000) that explains the basic facts of housing markets. In particular, we develop a 
decentralised long-run equilibrium model with ex-ante heterogeneous buyers and 
sellers, based on both the bargaining and the costly search activity that characterises 
the housing market. The proposed work takes the distinctive features of the 
considered market into account, where the formal distinction between buyer and 
seller becomes very subtle. In the model, in fact, a seller can become a buyer and vice 
versa. Indeed, most houses are bought by those who already own one, and most 
houses are sold by those wanting to buy another house (Janssen et al., 1994); indeed, 
buyers today are potential sellers tomorrow (Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). 
In this model, price dispersion comes from two sources: first, the bargaining power of 
the parties, since different bargaining powers lead to different selling prices for two 
similar houses; second, the search costs of sellers and buyers, since the ex-ante 
heterogeneity of the parties implies different search costs and thus individuals obtain 
different values from a conclusive transaction. Furthermore, this theoretical model is 
able to explain the positive correlation between housing price and trading volume, and 
between housing price and the time-on-the-market. 
In addition, search and matching frictions rationalize market non-clearing even in the 
presence of flexible prices. As a result, this model allows to overcome a major 
drawback of the hedonic pricing theory: the assumption of perfect competition (Quan 
and Quigley, 1991; Habito et al., 2010; Harding et al., 2003a; Harding et al., 2003b; 
Cotteleer and Gardebroek, 2006). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the housing market 
matching model; while section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
2.1 The hypotheses of the model 
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In this section, we follow the matching model developed by Lisi (2011). Since we are 
interested in selling price, the market of reference is the homeownership market 
rather than the rental market. In this way, if a contract is legally binding (as 
hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the circumstances preceding the bill 
of sale, unless a new and distinct contractual relationship is set up. In matching model 
jargon this means that the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller match does not 
exist. 
The economy is populated by N  types of sellers (which we indicate with N1,...,i = ) 
and by M  types of buyers (which we indicate with M1,...,j = ). “Type” refers to the 
economic rather than social or personal characteristics of the individual. We indicate 
with 
is  a measure of sellers of type i  and with jb  a measure of buyers of type j . 
Hence, we can think of ∑ = Ss
i
 and ∑ = Bb
i
 as measures of the stock of sellers and 
buyers in the economy, respectively. Sellers hold 2h ≥  houses of which 1h −  are on 
the market, i.e. vacancies ( v ) are simply given by ( ) 0S1hv >⋅−= , thus assuming a 
vacancy rate permanently positive (as in Wheaton, 1990). It is therefore possible that a 
buyer of type j  can become a seller of type i , and that a seller of type i  can become a 
buyer of type j . 
The expected values of a vacant house (V ) and of buying a house ( H ) are given by: 2 
( ) [ ]VPθqarV i −⋅+−=                             [1] 
( ) [ ]PHxθgerH j −−⋅+−=                             [2] 
where 
B
v
θ ≡  is the housing market tightness from the sellers’ standpoint,3  while ( )θq  
and ( )θg  are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of filling a vacant house and 
of finding/buying a home. The popular hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the 
matching function, { }Bv,mm = , is adopted (see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and 
Pissarides, 2001). Hence, the properties of these functions are straightforward: 
( ) 0θq' <  and ( ) 0θg' > .4 The terms ia  and je  represent, respectively, the costs 
                                                 
2
 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the future at the rate r . 
As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the stationary state. 
3
 By definition, markets with frictions require positive and finite tightness, i.e. ∞<< θ0 . 
4
 Standard technical assumptions are assumed: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ θglimθqlim θ0θ , and 
( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim θ0θ == ∞→→ . 
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sustained by sellers of type i  for the advertisement of vacancies and the effort (in 
monetary terms) made by buyers of type j  to find and visit the largest possible 
number of houses. If a contract is stipulated, the buyer of type j  gets a benefit x  from 
the property (abandoning the home searching value) and pays the sale price P  to the 
seller of type i  (who abandons the value of finding another buyer). As in Habito et al. 
(2010), the buyer’s benefit x  is a positive function of housing characteristics, i.e. it 
does not depend on the buyer’s type. 
 
2.2 Equilibrium 
The endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously at equilibrium are 
market tightness (θ ) and sale price ( P ). 
The customary long-term equilibrium condition, namely the “zero-profit” or “free-
entry” condition, normally used in the matching models (see Pissarides, 2000) yields 
the first key relationship of the model, in which market tensions are a positive function 
of price. In fact, using the condition 0V =  in [1], we obtain: 
( ) ( ) Paθqθq
P
a i1
i
=⋅⇒=
−
                [3] 
with 0
P
θ
>
∂
∂
 since ( ) 0θq' < . In short, if the price increases, more sellers will stand in 
the market; hence, it will be more difficult to fill the vacant houses. Consequently, 
fewer vacancies will be on the market. 
The free-entry condition also implies a trade-off between the housing price and the 
speed of sales for the sellers. In fact, with an arrival rate of ( )θq , the expected time-
on-the-market is ( ) 1−θq . As a result, from [3] there is a positive correlation between 
housing prices and the time on the market (as pointed by Leung, Leong and Chan, 
2002; Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Diaz and Jerez, 2009). 
The (generalised) Nash bargaining solution, usually used for decentralised markets, 
allows the sale price P  to be obtained through the optimal subdivision of surplus (S ) 
deriving from a successful match:
 5
 
( ) ( )
43421321
buyer of gain  capitalseller of gain  capital
PHxVPS −−+−=  
                                                 
5
 Entering into a contractual agreement obviously implies that 0S > , i.e. Hx > , θ∀ . This realistic 
condition ensures that the price is positive. 
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HxS −=⇒                   [4] 
The price is obtained by solving the following optimisation condition: 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )PHxγ1
γ
P
PHxVP argmaxP
i
i
γ1γ ii
−−⋅
−
=⇒
−−⋅−=
−
 
where 
iγ  is the bargaining power of sellers of type i . Knowing that 
( ) ( ) P
γ
γ1
PHx
i
i
⋅
−
=−− , eventually we get: 
( )HxγP i −⋅= ( )( ) ( )i
ji
γ1θgr
erxγ
P
−⋅+
+⋅
=⇒
                          
[5] 
Equation [5] is none other than the hedonic price function of the model. In fact, the 
selling price depends positively on the buyer’s benefit x , which in turn depends 
positively on the housing characteristics. 
Since ( ) 0θg' > , as market tensions increase, the sale price decreases; hence, we 
obtain the second key relationship of the model: 0
θ
P
<
∂
∂
. In short, if the tightness 
increases, the effect of the well-know congestion externalities on the demand side (see 
Pissarides, 2000) will lower the selling price. 
Finally, it is straightforward to obtain from [3] that when P  tends to zero (infinity), θ  
tends to zero (infinity), as ( )θq  tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the 
negative slope of [5] and the fact that price is always positive, only one long term 
equilibrium deriving from the intersection of the two curves exists in the model (see 
point A in Figure 1). 
========== Figure 1 about here (now at the end) ========== 
 
2.3 Comparative statics and price dispersion 
From [5], the selling price crucially depends on the bargaining power of the seller. In 
fact, 
0P0γ i =⇒→ , and 
r
e
xP1γ
j
i +=⇒→  
since the price can never be negative or null, we assume that 1γ0 i ≤< . 
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Furthermore, the selling price also depends on the search costs of buyers and sellers. 
In particular, from [5] it is straightforward to obtain that an increase in the search 
effort of buyers (
je ) increases the selling price. This is an intuitive result. However, a 
partially counter-intuitive result regards the effect of advertising vacancies on the 
selling price. In fact, an increase in 
ia  decreases market tightness, which in turn 
increases the selling price (see Figure 2). In short, an increase in the seller’s search cost 
also leads to an increase in the selling price. 
========== Figure 2 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Intuitively, the trading volume for a given period is given by the matching rate (Leung 
and Zhang, 2011). Although in this simple model the search costs of buyers and sellers 
are exogenous, it is straightforward to include them in the matching function, i.e. 
{ }B,ev;,amm ji= . An increase in the search effort (advertising vacancies) will increase 
the matching rate, since the probability of finding a home (of filling a vacant house) 
will be higher. As a result, the model could also explain the positive relationship 
between housing price and trading volume, since an increase in the search costs of 
buyers and sellers increases the selling price. This is in line with the empirical works of 
Fisher et al. (2003) and Leung, Lau and Leong (2002). 
Finally, we consider two similar houses, Y and Z, which give the same benefit: 
ZY xx = . 
In this case, price dispersion in the model comes from: 
a) The bargaining power of sellers (
iγ ): different bargaining powers lead to different 
selling price; 
b) The search costs of sellers (
ia ) and buyers ( je ): in fact, since matching occurs 
between a seller of type i  and a buyer of type j , different pairs lead to different 
search costs, which in turn imply different selling prices. 
The key determinant of price dispersion is in fact the heterogeneity in buyers and 
sellers incorporated in the formula of selling price. The housing price dispersion exists 
as long as the heterogeneous search costs enter the pricing formula, no matter how 
the prices are determined (Leung and Zhang, 2011).
6
 
 
2.4 Closing the model 
                                                 
6
 Vukina and Zheng (2010) find a very strong empirical support for the theoretical prediction that 
bargaining with search costs explains price dispersion in the agricultural market. 
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In order to close the model in a very simple manner, we normalise the population in 
the housing market to the unit, i.e. BS1 += . As a result, using the definitions of 
equilibrium tightness ( *θθ = ) and vacancies, we obtain the stock of sellers, buyers, 
and the “natural” vacancy rate: 
*θ1h
*θ
S
+−
=                  [6] 
*θ1h
1h
B
+−
−
=                  [7] 
( )
*θ1h
*θ1h
v
+−
⋅−
=                  [8] 
The “natural” vacancy rate is the optimal share of houses for sale on the market that 
prevails in long term equilibrium at which sellers make no economic profits (Arnott 
and Igarashi, 2000; McDonald, 2000). 
 
3. Conclusions 
This paper develops a matching model à la Pissarides (2000) in order to explain the 
basic facts of housing markets, most of all the variance in house prices. Price 
dispersion is basically due to both the ex-ante heterogeneity of the parties (bargaining 
power, tastes, asymmetric information) and the search costs of buyers and sellers. In 
fact, sellers and buyers spend time and money (for advertising vacancies and making 
the effort to visit the greatest number of house) before concluding the deal. 
Furthermore, the house price is substantially determined by a deal between the 
parties. These factors affect the selling price and lead to price dispersion. This simple 
theoretical model is able to take these distinctive features into account, thus 
explaining the basic facts of housing markets. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Increase in the search costs of sellers (advertising vacancies) 
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